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What Can Aid Do?
David B. Skarbek and Peter T. Leeson
Under normal conditions, devoting more resources to X’s produc-
tion produces more X. This follows from the nature of the physical
world, which positively relates quantities of outputs to quantities of
inputs used in their production. In principles of economics classes, it
is common to highlight that this relationship has nothing to do with
the economic problem. The economic problem asks how to produce
X in the least-cost way, whether to produce more or less X, and
indeed, whether to produce any X at all given the alternative uses of
the inputs required to produce it. 
Solving the economic problem determines whether a country’s
economy develops. It is strange, then, that professional economists
have had trouble distinguishing the positive relationship between
inputs and outputs from solving the economic problem when it
comes to evaluating foreign aid.1 The purpose of this article is to
make this distinction, and in doing so to clarify what aid can and can-
not do. 
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1 Easterly (2009) comes close to making this distinction in his recent summary of the
aid literature on Africa, where he identifies the key change between large and rapid
“transformational” programs and smaller, “marginal” changes.
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Foreign aid’s advocates claim aid has been successful. Aid’s critics
claim aid has failed. We explain why both camps are correct. Aid can,
and in a few cases has, increased a particular output by devoting
more resources to its production. In this sense, aid has occasionally
had limited success. However, aid cannot, and has not, contributed
to the solution of economic problems and therefore economic
growth. In this much more important sense, aid has failed.
Flashbacks from Econ 101
Economic progress requires economic efficiency: resource alloca-
tions that maximize resources’ value to society. Economic efficiency
improves when economic actors move resources from less-valued
uses to more-valued ones. Economic actors tend to move resources
in this way when they make their decisions in an institutional envi-
ronment defined by private property rights.2 In this institutional envi-
ronment, market prices emerge that communicate information to
entrepreneurs about how to use resources in ways that enhance
wealth, and entrepreneurs have incentives to act on this information
(see Mises 1920, Hayek 1945, Kirzner 1978, Coyne and Leeson
2004). Central planning, which attempts to allocate resources with-
out private property and market prices, cannot allocate resources
efficiently because central planners can’t learn about resource alloca-
tions that maximize resources’ value (Mises 1920, Hayek 1945).3
Since central planning cannot promote economic efficiency, it
cannot promote economic progress. Nevertheless, like anyone else,
central planners can increase a given output by devoting more
resources to its production. There is nothing surprising about this
fact. The nature of the physical world, including the positive relation-
ship between inputs and outputs, is as true for central planners as for
anyone else. The distinction between a central planner’s ability to
increase a particular output by devoting more resources to its pro-
duction and his ability to solve the economic problem is where most
evaluations of foreign aid go awry.
2 Evidence for the positive relationship between private property rights and econom-
ic progress is voluminous. For just a few recent examples, see Gwartney and Lawson
(2008) and Leeson (2009).
3 This is true even if central planners have incentives to allocate resources efficient-
ly, which is highly questionable (see Boettke and Leeson 2004).
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An example from the real world illustrates the relationship, or
rather lack of relationship, between increasing a predetermined out-
put by devoting more resources to its production and solving the eco-
nomic problem. Before its collapse, the Soviet Union devoted
substantial resources to training scientists and engineers. Because of
these expenditures, during the 1980s the Soviet Union had 10–30
percent more scientists and engineers than the United States
(Dezhina and Graham 1999). Occasionally, people pretend this fact
illuminates the relative efficiency of these countries’ contrasting eco-
nomic systems.
It does no such thing. If the United States had devoted as many
resources to training scientists and engineers as the Soviet Union, it
could have produced as many scientists and engineers, and perhaps
many more. However, the United States allowed private citizens to
determine resource allocations in a way the Soviet Union did not.
Under the institution of private property, U.S. citizens used market
prices to direct resources to ends they valued more than additional
scientists and engineers. While the United States had fewer people
trained in these professions, it was richer than the Soviet Union
because markets consider alternative uses when they allocate
resources. Although the Soviet Union had many more scientists and
engineers, it was poorer than the United States because central plan-
ners allocated resources without considering alternative uses.
What Can Aid Do?
Before discussing what aid can do, we discuss what it cannot do.
Foreign aid cannot make recipient economies grow. As Easterly
(2006) points out, foreign aid is akin to central planning with exter-
nally gifted funds. Central planning cannot create economic growth
because it lacks private property and market prices, which prevents
it from solving economic problems. It follows that aid, therefore,
cannot generate economic growth either. 
For example, the influential Harrod-Domar model suggests
financing the difference between the investment required to achieve
some growth rate and a developing country’s savings. While aid may
supply additional capital to poor countries, these finances do not tell
recipient planners how to invest them in economically efficient
ways—that is, in ways that produce wealth.
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Hayek (1944) pointed out that central planning “works” when it
has only one will to satisfy and one goal to focus on achieving.4 Under
such circumstances, there is no economic problem to solve because
there are no competing demands for resource uses and consequent-
ly no trade-offs for planners to negotiate. This is why central planning
tends to be more effective during war. During war, there’s a more-or-
less singular end—victory. For the same reason, aid is more effective
when it is aimed at a singular, predetermined end, such as reducing
malaria.
However, this “effectiveness” does not help aid solve the econom-
ic problem that keeps poor countries poor. There isn’t a unified, lex-
icographic preference for one good in developing economies. There
are many different individuals with different and conflicting
demands, and thus different and conflicting uses for scarce
resources. Developing countries confront an economic problem—
one regarding appropriate resource allocations. Foreign and domes-
tic aid planners don’t know how to use aid in ways that generate a
pattern of resource movement away from less-valued uses toward
more-valued ones. Thus, as Andrei Shleifer (2009: 380) puts it, “The
consensus that aid has failed is nearly universal among those who
look at the data.”5 Aid cannot solve economic problems.
So, what can aid do? Like other forms of central planning, aid can
increase X by devoting additional resources to X’s production.
Returning to our example from the Soviet Union, aid can produce
more scientists and engineers. If planners pick a specific outcome,
such as more immunizations, aid can provide additional resources to
produce immunizations. All of the “success stories” that aid’s advo-
cates highlight are of this nature. 
In his book The End of Poverty, aid’s most prominent academic
advocate, Jeffrey Sachs (2006), provides a list of aid “successes.”
These successes include the Green Revolution in Asia, the eradica-
tion of small pox, improvements in children’s health, dispersions of
vaccines, reductions in the spread of malaria, control of African river
blindness, the eradication of polio, improvements in family planning,
and the mobile phone revolution in Bangladesh. 
4 For a discussion of Hayek’s “one will” idea and its relationship to Arrow’s impossi-
bility theorem, see Boettke and Leeson (2002).
5 See Easterly 2002, 2006; Leeson 2008; and Moyo 2009.
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Though Easterly is an aid critic, the aid “successes” he highlights
also involve increasing a particular output by devoting more
resources to its production (Easterly 2006: 175–77). These successes
include programs designed to keep Bangladeshi girls in school,
reduce the percentage of malnourished children in Bangladesh, con-
trol tuberculosis deaths, improve child nutrition in Tanzania, and
reduce infant mortality. Easterly (2009) argues that education and
health programs in Africa in particular have been successful. He
notes the achievements of the “elimination of smallpox, the near-
eradication of river blindness and Guinea worm, the spread of oral
rehydration therapy for treating infant diarrheal diseases, DDT cam-
paigns against malarial mosquitoes … and the success of WHO vac-
cination programs against measles and other childhood diseases. The
aid campaign against diseases in Africa … is likely the single biggest
success story in the history of aid to Africa” (Easterly 2009: 406–07). 
In pointing out that aid can produce more of a given output by
increasing expenditures on that output, we have delineated the max-
imum aid can do. In many cases aid has failed even to achieve this.
Sometimes aid resources intended for a particular output do not lead
to more of that output because of incentive problems and a lack of
knowledge about local conditions that impede aid’s application.6
Corruption is sufficient to prevent aid from increasing a particular,
targeted output. If a recipient government corruptly appropriates aid
resources intended for vaccinations and diverts these resources to its
supporters instead, vaccinations may not increase despite the
attempt to devote more resources to their production.7
Conclusion
At least in principle, foreign aid can increase X by devoting more
resources to X’s production. In some cases aid has managed to do this
in practice. Aid advocates herald these cases as evidence of aid’s “suc-
cess.” However, these cases are “successes” in the same sense that
6 In fact, Coyne and Ryan (2009) find that a large amount of foreign aid goes to the
world’s worst dictators, which suggests that some aid programs might be financing
the accomplishment of a single, illiberal end.
7 On the problems of government failure that can plague the foreign aid process as
much as other political processes, see Tullock (2002). On these problems in the for-
eign aid process in particular, see Gibson et al. (2005). 
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the Soviet Union’s army of scientists and engineers was a “success.”
They are successes of increasing a predetermined output by devot-
ing more resources to its production. They are not economic success-
es. Aid cannot, and has not, increased economic growth. Economic
growth requires a solution to the economic problem of how to allo-
cate resources in ways that maximize their value. Like other forms of
central planning, aid necessarily remains silent on this question. In
this much more important sense, aid’s critics are correct that aid has
failed. 
Aid’s advocates and critics should be clearer about what they mean
when they say aid can and can’t “work.” The distinction this article
makes explains why it is possible to both acknowledge the aid “suc-
cess stories” that aid’s advocates highlight and consider aid a doomed
approach to development. By clarifying what aid can and can’t do, we
hope our analysis helps economists and policymakers evaluate aid’s
potential more sensibly.
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